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To Be Scientific Is to Be Interactive 
 
Abstract 
Hempel, Popper, and Kuhn argue that to be scientific is to be testable, to be falsifiable, and 
most nearly to do normal science, respectively. I argue that to be scientific is largely to be 
interactive, offering some examples from science to show that the ideas from different fields 
of science interact with one another. The results of the interactions are that hypotheses 
become more plausible, new phenomena are explained and predicted, we understand 
phenomena from a new perspective, and our worldview becomes simpler. I also argue that 
given that the interactions are impressive features of science, astrology and religion would be 
regarded as science, provided that there are similar interactions in those enterprises. 
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1. Introduction 
What is the nature of science? This question is interesting in itself for those who want to 
know what science is. In addition, an answer to this question has an important practical 
implication. What we should teach to our school children in science classrooms depends on 
what we take to be what science is. Some people may argue that astrology and creation 
science are science like astronomy and biology, so they should also be taught in schools. 
Others may argue that they do not meet the standards of science, so they should not be taught 
in schools. The resolution of the dispute between the opposing camps requires a clear 
conception of what science is. 
In general, there are three approaches to understand an object. I call them the historical 
approach, the functional approach, and the compositional approach. To put briefly, we 
investigate where an object came from, what it does, and what it is made up of in order to 
understand it. In the following sections, I expound the three different approaches and then 
apply the compositional approach to science. I introduce Carl Hempel, Karl Popper, and 
Thomas Kuhn’s compositional definitions of science, and then present my own. This paper is 
intended to be useful not only to philosophers of science but also to policymakers who ought 
to make decisions on what we should teach in science classrooms.  
 
2. Three Approaches 
The historical approach is an attempt to understand an object by shedding light on where it 
came from. For example, what is human species? Evolutionists say that humans have evolved 
from single-celled organisms, whereas creationists say that God created them. Evolutionists 
and creationists disagree about the origin of human species but agree that we can understand 
human species by unveiling its history, especially its origin. Similarly, the big bang theory is 
an attempt to understand the universe by tracking its history, especially its origin. The theory 
holds that the universe, which was smaller than an atom, expanded approximately 14 billion 
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years ago. The historical approach is built on the view that we cannot fully understand an 
object without knowing its history, especially its origin.  
The functional approach is an attempt to understand an object by throwing light on 
what it does. For example, think of sundials, water clocks, and digital clocks (Schick and 
Vaughn, 2010: 125). They might have come from different factories, and they might be made 
up of different materials. Yet, they all belong to the same kind, viz., clocks, because they all 
perform the same function, viz., keeping time. What makes a clock what it is is what it does, 
not where it came from or what it is made up of. The same thing can be said of a gene. A gene 
is whatever is responsible for phenotypes and whatever conveys the hereditary information 
from parents to offspring. The functional approach is built on the view that we cannot fully 
understand an object without knowing what it does. 
The compositional approach is an attempt to understand an object by casting light on 
what it is made up of. For example, what is water? Chemists say that water is H2O. The 
essence of water lies in its chemical composition. In other words, what makes water what it is 
is what it is made up of. Presocratic philosophers in ancient Greece proposed various 
hypotheses about the fundamental building blocks of the universe (Jones, 1970). For 
examples, Thales, Anaximander, Pythagoras, and Democritus contended that everything is 
made out of water, boundless, numbers, and atoms, respectively. Their hope was to 
understand physical objects like trees, apples, stones, and so on by investigating their 
physical compositions. The compositional approach is built on the view that we cannot fully 
understand an object without knowing what it is made up of. 
The preceding three approaches can be applied to science. We might take the historical 
approach, investigating the history of science, especially the origin of science. Thus, we 
might inquire into what Presocratics were doing, as Popper (1963, Chapter 5) suggests. 
According to Popper, Presocratics initiated science by being engaged in a series of 
conjectures and refutations over the basic stuff of the universe. We might take the functional 
approach, investigating what science does. We might, for example, explore the impacts of 
science on economy, on politics, culture, on art, on religion, on environment, on civilization, 
etc. This paper, however, takes neither the historical approach nor the functional approach to 
science due to lack of space. It takes only the compositional approach to science. 
Science is composed of certain activities. The most salient ones are constructing 
hypotheses, observing the world, and performing experiments. Also, science is not an 
individualistic enterprise but a collaborative enterprise, as sociologists of science (Latour and 
Woolgar, 1986; Latour, 1987) aptly observe. Scientists hold a meeting to reach an agreement 
on whether a particular experimental result establishes a hypothesis or not. They attend 
conferences and publish papers where they criticize opponents’ hypotheses and experiments, 
and defend their own hypotheses and experiments from their opponents’ criticisms. In order 
to do these things, they use the research funds from governments, universities, and private 
industries.  
This paper focuses on the scientific activities related to hypotheses. Scientists do not 
set up any hypotheses. Certain hypotheses count as scientific, whereas others do not. 
Consider the hypothesis that everything is the way it is because God made it so. Such 
hypotheses do not count as scientific, and hence it is inappropriate to teach them in schools. 
This attitude, however, triggers an interesting question: How do scientific hypotheses differ 
from nonscientific hypotheses, including religious ones? Some philosophers of science have 
already answered this question in the philosophy of science literature. Their answers, 
however, differ from one another. I summarize them and propose my own in the following 
section. 
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3. Scientific Hypotheses 
3.1. Testability 
Hempel (1966) proposes that to be scientific is to be testable. A scientific hypothesis is one 
that has a bearing on observations. We go through the following process to test a hypothesis: 
Assume that the hypothesis is true, we imagine what observable events would occur and 
would not occur. We observe the relevant part of the world. The hypothesis is confirmed and 
disconfirmed, respectively, if an observable event occurs that agrees with it, and if another 
observable event occurs that disagrees with it. Thus, the hypothesis passes or fails a test, 
depending on what observable event occurs. Hempel summarizes the point as follows:  
 
..no statement or set of statements T can be significantly proposed as a scientific hypothesis or 
theory unless it is amenable to objective empirical test, at least “in principle.” (Hempel, 1966: 
30) 
 
The ideal gas law, for example, states that PV=kT, where p is the pressure of the gas, V is the 
volume of the gas, k is a constant, and T is the temperature of the gas. We can test the ideal 
gas law as follows: We assume that the ideal gas law is true. We hold V constant, increase T, 
and then check whether P increases or decreases. The ideal gas law is confirmed and 
disconfirmed, respectively, if P increases and decreases.  
Compare the ideal gas law with the following two hypotheses: (1) One ghost can stand 
on the tip of a needle. (2) Two ghosts can stand on the tip of a needle. Imagine that two 
people disagree over whether (1) or (2) is true. They agree, however, that a ghost is invisible, 
weightless, and tiny. One argues that (1) is true, so they need to sacrifice one goat for one 
ghost. The other argues that (2) is true, so they need to sacrifice two goats for two ghosts. 
They have a quarrel for a day, but they fail to reach an agreement. Hempel would say that 
neither (1) nor (2) is testable, i.e., neither (1) nor (2) has a bearing on observations. Therefore, 
none of them is scientific. 
 
3.2. Falsifiability 
Alfred Adler (1970-1937) founded a school of thought called individual psychology. 
Individual psychology holds that all human behavior is motivated by the feeling of inferiority. 
Popper (1963) objects that individual psychology remains unrefuted, no matter what happens. 
Imagine, for example, that a man pushes a child into a river. According to individual 
psychology, the man did so because he suffered from the feeling of inferiority and he wanted 
to prove to himself that he dared to commit a crime. Imagine now that the man rescued a 
drowning child in a river. According to individual psychology, he did so because he suffered 
from the feeling of inferiority and he wanted to prove to himself that he dared to rescue the 
child. Individual psychology is compatible with whatever the man does. We cannot even 
conceive of an observable event that would refute individual psychology.  
Popper compares individual psychology with Albert Einstein’s general theory of 
relativity. If the general theory of relativity is true, light would travel in a curved path near the 
sun, and hence we would be able to observe the change of apparent positions of stars during 
the solar eclipse. If the change of apparent positions of stars is not perceptible, the general 
theory of relativity would be refuted. Thus, the general theory of relativity is compatible with 
certain observable events but incompatible with other observable events. We can conceive of 
an observable event that would refute the general theory of relativity.  
On Popper’s view, to be scientific is to be falsifiable. A hypothesis is falsifiable if and 
only if we can conceive of an observable event that is incompatible with it. Thus, 
4 
 
falsifiability is the criterion for distinguishing between scientific hypotheses and nonscientific 
hypotheses: 
 
The criterion of falsifiability is a solution to this problem of demarcation, for it says that 
statements or systems of statements, in order to be ranked as scientific, must be capable of 
conflicting with possible, or conceivable, observations. (Popper, 1963: 51) 
 
Note that Popper invokes conceivable observations, not actual observations, to flesh out the 
notion of falsifiability. There is a huge difference between actual and conceivable 
observations. If a hypothesis conflicts with an actual observation, it is falsified. Past theories, 
such as the Ptolemaic theory, the phlogiston theory of combustion, and the caloric theory of 
heat were falsified because they conflicted with actual observations. In contrast, if a 
hypothesis conflicts with a conceivable observation, but not with an actual observation, it is 
not falsified but falsifiable. 
Let me apply Popper’s proposal to a tricky example. Consider the hypothesis that our 
universe collides with another universe. Many theoretical physicists today argue that there are 
many expanding universes, and that if our universe collides with another universe, the impact 
between the two universes “would send shock waves rippling through space, generating 
modifications to the pattern of hot and cold regions in the microwave background radiation” 
(Greene, 2011: 191). Unfortunately, scientists have not yet detected the modifications. Is this 
hypothesis falsifiable or not? Popper would say that it is falsifiable. After all, we can conceive 
of the situation in which no such modification occurs in our universe.  
The hypothesis that our universe collides with another universe is different from the 
unfalsifiable hypotheses, such as the supernatural hypothesis that everything is the way it is 
because God made it so and Adler’s individual psychology that all human behavior is 
motivated by the feeling of inferiority. We cannot even conceive of an observable event that 
conflicts with the supernatural hypothesis or individual psychology. Whatever observable 
event we might think up is compatible with them. Therefore, they are not falsifiable. 
 
3.3. Normal Science 
Kuhn contends that Popper’s characterization of science applies to extraordinary science, but 
not to normal science. In other words, scientists attempt to falsify theories during the research 
period of extraordinary science, but not during the research period of normal science. 
Moreover, normal science “accounts for the overwhelming majority of the work done in basic 
science” (Kuhn, 1970: 4). On Kuhn’s proposal, to be scientific is most nearly to do normal 
science:  
 
Finally, and this is for now my main point, a carefully look at the scientific enterprise suggests 
that it is normal science, in which Sir Karl’s sort of testing does not occur, rather than 
extraordinary science which most nearly distinguishes science from other enterprises. (Kuhn, 
1970: 6). 
 
Normal science is what scientists do after a paradigm is established, and it is followed by 
extraordinary science. Thus, we need to be clear about the concepts of paradigm, normal 
science, and extraordinary science in order to understand Kuhn’s definition of science. 
A paradigm is “the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared 
by the members of a given community” (Kuhn, 1962/1970: 175). For example, the 
Copernican paradigm and the Ptolemaic paradigm have different beliefs about the world. The 
former includes the belief that the earth moves around the sun, and the latter includes the 
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belief that the earth is the center of the universe. The former takes it to be important to 
measure the speed of the earth, whereas the latter does not. Copernican scientists have the 
skill to use telescopes, but Ptolematic scientists do not. Once scientists successfully explain 
puzzling phenomena in terms of a new theory, a paradigm is established and normal science 
begins. 
Normal scientists dogmatically hang onto a paradigm. Without questioning the 
paradigm, they are engaged in puzzle-solving activities. To solve puzzles is to apply a 
paradigm to various parts of the world, to articulate the paradigm, to devise mathematical 
techniques, to improving scientific instruments, and so on. If a scientist fails to solve a puzzle, 
blame is put not on the paradigm but on the scientist. In other words, if an experimental result 
conflicts with a paradigm, normal scientists think that it is the experimental result, not the 
paradigm, that should be thrown out. As they apply the paradigm to various parts of the world, 
they encounter phenomena which cannot be accommodated by the paradigm. Such 
phenomena are called anomalies.  
The accumulation of serious anomalies leads scientists to lose confidence on the 
paradigm, and scientists start doing extraordinary science. Extraordinary scientists question 
their paradigm. They are no longer engaged in solving puzzles. Rather, they ask philosophical 
questions about the world, and they think up a new paradigm. The new paradigm is 
incompatible with the old one. They postulate different theoretical entities, and they pose 
different questions about the world. Finally, the old paradigm is abandoned, and the new 
paradigm is adopted. 
     On Kuhn’s account, astronomy is science but astrology is not because astronomers 
solve puzzles, but astrologers do not. Ptolemaic astronomers were solving puzzles when they 
fiddled with epicycles, eccentrics, and equants. The mismatch between the Ptolemaic theory 
and the motions of planets was a puzzle they had to solve. They were revising the Ptolemaic 
theory so that it might fit the motions of planets. In contrast, astrology was not in the business 
of solving puzzles: 
 
The astrologer, by contrast, had no such puzzles. The occurrence of failures could be explained, 
but particular failures did not give rise to research puzzles, for no man, however skilled, could 
make use of them in a constructive attempt to revise the astrological tradition. (Kuhn, 1970: 9) 
 
When astrologers made false predictions about a person’s fate, they did not attempt to revise 
astrological hypotheses. They thought that their failures to make true predictions did not 
constitute puzzles they should solve. Since they did not solve puzzles, their enterprise does 
not account as science. 
What are we to make of Kuhn’s account of science? Several criticisms can be leveled 
at it. My criticism is that it is silent about interdisciplinary research and education in science. 
As we will see in the following section, the ideas from different fields of science interact with 
one another. Scientists belonging to different paradigms cooperate with one another to solve a 
common problem. It is not clear how Kuhn’s account of science can handle this interactive 
aspect of science. 
 
3.4. Interaction 
Let me advance a slogan that captures an important aspect of science, viz., to be scientific is 
largely to be interactive. It is ubiquitous phenomena at least in contemporary science that the 
ideas from different fields of science interact with one another. As a result, hypotheses 
become more plausible, new phenomena are explained and predicted, we come to understand 
phenomena from a new perspective, and our worldview becomes simpler. I introduce the 
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following five ways, which are not intended to be exhaustive, in which ideas interact with 
one another in science: 
First, scientists today take into account the research achievements of neighboring fields 
when they set up hypotheses in their own fields. For example, physicists developed the 
radiometric dating technique at the end of 19th century. The technique enables us to determine 
how old material objects are. Geologists make use of the technique when they construct 
hypotheses about distant pasts. Seungbae Park (2011: 80-82) calls this phenomenon neighbor 
constraint. The idea is that the research achievements of a field of science impose constraints 
on the hypothesis constructions of neighboring fields of science. A geological hypothesis 
born with the neighbor constraint of the radiometric dating technique is more plausible than a 
competing hypothesis born without the constraint. It is for this reason that the hypothesis that 
the earth is about 4.5 billion years old is more likely to be true than the hypothesis that it is 
six thousand years old.  
Second, as Michael Friedman (1981) observes, theories from different fields of science 
jointly predict and explain new phenomena. For example, evolutionary theory claims that 
marsupials flourished in South America millions of years ago. The theory of plate tectonics 
claims that South America, Antarctica, and Australia once formed a giant continent called 
Gondwanaland, and they drifted apart millions of years ago. Aware of these two theories, 
scientists speculated for years that marsupials migrated from South America to Australia via 
Antarctica, and inferred that there are marsupial fossils in Antarctica. A group of scientists 
discovered the marsupial fossils in Antarctica (Woodburne and Zinsmeister, 1982). Note that 
neither the biological theory nor the geological theory alone can explain the existence of 
marsupial fossils in Antarctica. Their existence can only be explained by the cooperation of 
the two theories. 
Third, there is an incessant quest for unification in science. The intuitive idea of 
unification is that X and Y appear to be different kinds of objects, but on close examination, 
they are just different manifestations of the same kind of objects. For example, water and fire 
appear to be different kinds of objects. But atomism tells us that they are just different 
collections of the same kind of things, viz., atoms. Thus, atomism unified water and fire. 
Once objects are unified, our worldview becomes simpler. The worldview that there are 
atoms and empty space is simpler than the worldview that there are water, fire, trees, stones, 
and so forth. What get unified in science are not only objects but also theories, laws, 
phenomena, and forces. Newton’s theory of motion unified Galileo Galilei’s law of freefall 
and Johannes Kepler’s three laws of planetary motion, explaining both the motions of 
terrestrial objects and the motions of planets. Theoretical physicists today proposed string 
theory to unify quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity, claiming that 
electromagnetic force, strong force, weak force, and gravitational force are all just different 
manifestations of a single fundamental force. Again, unification yields a simplified picture of 
the universe. 
Fourth, scientists not only come up with original ideas but also combine different 
original ideas so that the combination of the different ideas may work as a packet. For 
example, the law of inertia is not original with Newton. It was discovered by Galileo and 
formulated by René Descartes. Newton combined the law of inertia with his second law of 
motion, the third law of motion, and the law of gravity. These four laws of nature work 
together, i.e., they constitute a theory explaining and predicting the motions of bodies. For 
another example, evolutionary theory consists of the two big ideas: the tree of life and the 
principle of natural selection. Neither the tree of life nor the principle of natural selection was 
original with Darwin. The tree of life can be traced back to Augustin Augier and Jean-
Baptiste Lamarck who published the tree of plants in 1801 and the tree of animals in 1809, 
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respectively. The principle of natural selection can be traced back as far as to the ancient 
Greek philosopher, Empedocles, who claimed that “various body parts combined and those 
that were best able to function survived” (Everson, 2007: 5). What Darwin did was to graft 
the tree of life and the principle of natural selection and to use them to explain biological 
phenomena (Sober, 1993: 7). He initiated a new explanatory scheme, and hence a new 
paradigm in biology. When different ideas are combined and jointly explain phenomena, we 
come to understand phenomena from a new perspective.  
Fifth, scientists of different fields do research independently of one another, but their 
research results miraculously fit together. Let me use a controversial example. Some 
theoretical physicists accept but other theoretical physicists reject the multiverse hypothesis 
according to which there are an infinite number of universes. In some of those universes, 
there are people who look exactly like you. In others of those universes, physical features are 
radically different from those of our universe, and hence there are no such things as the earth, 
the solar system, and galaxies. The support for the multiverse hypothesis has come 
surprisingly from many independent researches (Greene, 2011). Let me introduce following 
three of them:  
The first support has come from the research concerning eternal inflation. Allen Guth 
(1981) came up with the inflationary hypothesis that our universe, which was smaller than an 
atom, expanded to the size much larger than the currently observable part of the universe in a 
tiny fraction of a second about 14 billion years ago. The inflationary hypothesis explains why 
the temperature, which is 2.725 above absolute zero, is uniform across space. Guth’s 
hypothesis led Alex Vilenkin (1983) and Andrei Linde (1983) to the hypothesis of eternal 
inflation according to which big bangs occur numerous times, i.e., countless universes are 
created. The hypothesis predicted that there would be temperature variations ranging from 
2.7245K to 2.7255K, and the actual measurements agree with the prediction. The hypothesis 
of eternal inflation goes along with the multiverse hypothesis.  
The second support has come from the research concerning dark energy. Astronomers 
discovered that the expansion of our universe is not slowing down but speeding up. The 
accelerating expansion is mysterious, given that gravitational pull among galaxies should 
reduce the expansion rate. Astronomers postulated the existence of dark energy to explain the 
accelerating expansion of the universe. Dark energy behaves like Einstein’s cosmological 
constant. Scientists measured the cosmological constant, and it turns out to be 10-122 in Plank 
units (Barrow and Shaw, 2011). Brian Greene (2011: 146) argues that this value goes well 
with the multiverse hypothesis. The idea is that if there are an infinite number of universes, it 
is natural that the cosmological constant is extremely close to zero in some universes. Our 
universe happens to be one of them. 
The third support has come from the research concerning string theory. String theory 
claims that everything is made out of tiny vibrating strands or loops of energy called strings. 
All the microscopic particles, such as electrons, quarks, and photons, are made out of strings. 
Strings become different particles, depending on how they vibrate. String theory requires that 
strings vibrate in extra dimensions of space. Every point in space is curled up with extra 
dimensions of space, and the shape of those extra dimensions determines how strings vibrate, 
and the vibration patterns determine how the universe behaves. Therefore, the way the extra 
dimensions are put together determine the fundamental features of the universe. It transpires 
that there are an astronomical number of different possible shapes of extra dimensions. This 
number meshes well with the multiverse hypothesis because each shape of extra dimensions 
represents each universe of multiverse (Susskind, 2003; Szabo, 2004).  
The hypothesis of eternal inflation, the hypothesis of dark energy, and string theory get 
connected with one another via the multiverse hypothesis. The three independent research 
8 
 
results concerning eternal inflation, dark energy, and extra dimensions converge on the 
multiverse hypothesis that there are an infinite number of universes (Greene, 2011: 9-10). 
The convergence here does not mean that the multiverse hypothesis unifies the hypothesis of 
eternal inflation, the hypothesis of dark energy, and string theory. Nor does it mean that the 
multiverse hypothesis is proved to be true. It simply means that the three independent 
research results jointly support the multiverse hypothesis, and that they are more plausible 
than they would if they stood alone. The multiverse hypothesis has an indirect bearing on 
observables, i.e., it is related to observables via the three independent research results which 
are somehow connected with observables. If the three independent research results collapse, 
so would the multiverse hypothesis. Thus, the multiverse hypothesis is more than a 
speculative assumption, an assumption that has no bearing on observables. 
One may object that the hypothesis of dark energy, the hypothesis of eternal inflation, 
and string theory are all from the same field of science, viz., theoretical physics. So this 
example does not fit my thesis that hypotheses from various fields of science interact with 
one another in contemporary science. I reply that theoretical physics consists of different 
subfields, such as cosmology and particle physics, the hypothesis of dark energy is from both 
cosmology and astronomy, the hypothesis of eternal inflation is from cosmology, and string 
theory is from particle physics. So this example by and large fits my thesis. 
So far I argued that in science, a research achievement of a field puts a neighbor 
constraint on the hypothesis construction of a neighboring field, hypotheses from different 
fields jointly predict and explain new phenomena, there is a ceaseless quest for unification, 
different ideas are grafted with one another to form a packet, and independent research results 
dovetail with each other. Given that these interactive features are the impressive features of 
science that hold people in awe, I propose that if astrology and religion have these features, 
they would undoubtedly be science just like physics, biology, and geology. Specifically, 
Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam would be science, provided that they impose neighbor 
constraints on one another, they jointly explain new phenomena, they attempt to unify the 
disparate laws of nature discovered in their own fields with a more fundamental law of nature, 
and different ideas from the religions form a packet, and independent research results of the 
religions converge on the same hypothesis. I leave the task of exhibiting these interactive 
features to astrologers and theists.  
I agree with Kuhn (1970) that there is no clear demarcation between science and non-
science. But I must say that there are typical scientific activities, and that the more an 
enterprise shows the typical scientific activities, the more scientific it is. The interactions of 
ideas from different fields of science are more typical and pervasive phenomena in present 
science than in past science. In present science, interdisciplinary research and education are 
encouraged, facilitating the communications between different fields of science. Some 
readers might think that the number of examples of interaction provided in this paper is too 
small. Let me bring their attention to Trefil and Hazen (2012). This book offers many 
examples, demonstrating just how prevalent the interactions of ideas are in contemporary 
science. 
The interactive aspect of science is an anomaly to Kuhn’s account of science. 
Theoretical physicists, for example, are doing neither normal science nor extraordinary 
science when they attempt to unify quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity. It 
is wrong to say that they are doing normal science within a paradigm because it is not clear 
whether unifying the two paradigms counts as a puzzle-solving activity. Kuhn (1962/1970) 
does not say anything about unifying two paradigms. It is also wrong to say that the 
theoretical physicists are doing extraordinary science because they do not aim to falsify 
quantum mechanics or the general theory of relativity. The unification of these two paradigms 
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does not mean that both of them or one of them is falsified. It would rather mean that they are 
subsumed under a more fundamental paradigm. 
Kuhn might reply that the theoretical physicists are solving a puzzle, viz., getting rid of 
an internal inconsistency within the grand paradigm, viz., physics. They all belong to the 
same grand paradigm. A problem with this move, however, is that the notion of paradigm 
would become intractable. After all, it might be argued that Ptolemaic astronomers and 
Copernican astronomers also belonged to the same grand paradigm, viz., astronomy. Kuhn’s 
original thesis that competing paradigms, such as the Ptolemaic paradigm and the Copernican 
paradigm, are incommensurable would collapse. After all, the Ptolemaic paradigm and the 
Copernican paradigm would merely be different components of the same grand paradigm, 
viz., astronomy, and hence they should be commensurable. To go further, science and religion 
would also be merely different components of the same grand paradigm, viz., the human 
intellectual endeavor. ‘Paradigm’ would cease to be a useful predicate.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Hempel, Popper, and Kuhn argue that to be scientific is to be testable, to be falsifiable, and 
most nearly to do normal science, respectively. I argued that to be scientific is largely to be 
interactive. I do not claim that Hempel’s, Popper’s, and Kuhn’s accounts of science capture 
no aspect of science. After all, they are supported by their examples, just as my account is 
supported by my examples from science. Hempel’s account, Popper’s account, and Kuhn’s 
account capture the aspects of science, respectively, that a hypothesis explains and predicts 
phenomena, a hypothesis is thrown out, and a hypothesis is adhered to. My account captures 
the aspect of science that different ideas interact with one another. My conclusion is that 
science has multiple facets, calling for multiple accounts. 
My conclusion has important implications on science education. First, the more an 
enterprise shows the aforesaid multiple aspects of science, the more scientific it is, and hence 
the more convincing it becomes that the enterprise deserves a place in science education. 
Second, if science teachers aim to unveil the nature of science to their students, they should 
help students see the aforementioned multiple facets of science. They should display the 
typical cases in which a hypothesis is tested, falsified, adhered to, and interacts with other 
hypotheses. Students will obtain a more complete picture of science, if they are exposed to all 
those facets of science than they would if they were exposed to only some of them. Finally, 
let me emphasize that students should know how the ideas from different fields of science 
interact with one another, given that we now live in the era when multidisciplinary research 
and education are encouraged to scientists. 
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